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Abstract: In this research work, the author focuses on the analysis of the directions of development 
of the new Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) or ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) as a project 
launched by China to develop countries and improve global connectivity. First unveiled in 2013 by 
Chinese President Xi Jinping, the initiative continues to grow in scale and popularity. The initiative is 
focused on creating networks that will allow for a more efficient and productive free flow of trade as 
well as further integration of international markets both physically and digitally. BRI is comprised of 
the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ and the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt;’ together they will connect 
more than 65 countries making up over 62% of the world’s population, around 35% of the world’s trade 
and over 31% of the world’s GDP. It will take the form of a series of highways, railways and ports as 
well as facilities for energy, telecommunications, healthcare and education. It must be emphasized that 
the initiative merges both the land-based Silk Road (from China via Central Asia to Turkey and the EU) 
with the Maritime Route (via the Indian Ocean and Africa to Europe). Both routes were created with the 
intention of developing transportation infrastructure, facilitating economic development and increasing 
trade. This 21st-century initiative is not merely for China to romanticize its historical legacies: it carries 
major strategic economic and geopolitical calculations. The EU must decide now if and how to engage 
in these emerging processes. The main aim of the article is to present the directions of development of 
the new Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) as a project, launched by China to develop countries 
and improve global connectivity.
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Introduction1
According to Chinese President Xi Jinping, as of January 2017 more than 100 coun-tries and international organizations have responded well to the Belt and Road Ini-
tiative (BRI) and over 40 have signed cooperation agreements. Already, over $900 bil-
lion of BRI-related projects are under way. However, it is worth noting that the Asian 
Development Bank estimates that by 2030 the initiative will cost over $22.6 trillion. 
None the less the Initiative has received an immense amount of positive reaction. In 
collaboration with the Belt and Road Initiative the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) was established with its headquarters placed in Beijing. AIIB is (according to 
its official website) “a new multilateral financial institution founded to bring countries 
together to address the daunting infrastructure needs across Asia.”
It was formally opened in January 2016 and to date has 56 member states and 26 pro-
spective members including all BRICS countries as well as the United Kingdom, France, 
1 Paper prepared in the framework of the Grant OPUS, Narodowe Centrum Nauki, NCN (Na-
tional Centre of Science, NCS), No. UMO 2013/11/B/HS5/03572.
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Italy, Germany and Hong Kong. China is the largest shareholder with 26.06% of the 
votes. It is the only party with more voting power than the combined power of the 14 EU 
members of AIIB, who hold a total of 19.04% of voting rights. In 2016, the bank com-
mitted $1.73 billion to nine development projects along the Belt and Road, six of which 
are in collaboration with lenders including the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank. The bank is credited with further connecting China to the rest of the world through 
international financial transactions and funding infrastructure.
1. From other projects to the Belt and Road
It remains to be seen if the United States and China will clash over their com-
peting plans for developing energy resources in Central Asia’s Turkmenistan, creat-
ing infrastructure in Pakistan, or winning political influence with local governments 
throughout Asia. Other Asian powers like India and Russia, meanwhile, are seeking to 
define their own approach to regional integration (Xiaobo, 2009). While these ambi-
tious projects hold the potential to reshape one of the world’s least integrated areas, all 
must contend with local rivalries, logistical roadblocks, security risks, and political 
uncertainty.
The Belt and Road Initiative includes six international ‘corridors.’ These are: 
(1) The new Eurasia land Bridge, (2) The China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, 
Chart 1. The six economic corridors of the new Silk Road
Source: http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/One-Belt-One-Road/The-Belt-and-
Road-Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm, June 9, 2018.
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(3) China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, (4) China-Indochina Peninsula 
Economic Corridor, (5) China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and (6) Bangladesh-Chi-
na-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor. BRI focuses on five main goals. (I) ‘Policy 
Coordination’ means that the initiative intends to encourage countries to jointly work 
and cooperate with each other to achieve projects. (II) ‘Cultural Exchange’ aims to 
promote people-to-people bonds and friendly interaction between enterprises as well 
as deeper cultural understanding so as to further international cooperation. (III) ‘Fi-
nancial Integration’ refers to BRI being designed to enhance monetary and financial 
cooperation when monitoring and dealing with risk as well as general financial in-
teractions. In addition, it looks to expand currency exchange and scope. (IV) ‘Trade 
and Investment’ – through BRI cross-border investments and trade are designed to be 
made easier and more cooperative between countries on the Belt and Road, promot-
ing economic integration. (V) ‘Facilities Connectivity’ focuses on building facilities 
to enable greater connectivity between countries on the Belt and Road e.g. rebuilding 
and developing ports, removing barriers, fixing roads, etc. (https://www.aiib.org/en/
projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018; Cao, Suttmeier, Simon, 2006; Xiaobo, 
2009).
The original Silk Road came into being during the westward expansion of China’s 
Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), which forged trade networks throughout what are today 
the Central Asian countries of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turk-
menistan, and Afghanistan, as well as modern-day Pakistan and India to the south. Those 
routes eventually extended over four thousand miles to Europe.
Map 1. Ferdinand von Richthofen’s Map of the Silk Road in 1877
Source: http://www.silkroutes.net/orient/mapssilkroutestrade.htm, June 9, 2018.
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Chart 2. Main Stations of the Silk Road in the Roman Empire
Source: https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selyem%C3%BAt, June 9, 2018.
Central Asia was thus the epicenter of one of the first waves of globalization, con-
necting eastern and western markets, spurring immense wealth, and intermixing cultural 
and religious traditions. Valuable Chinese silk, spices, jade, and other goods moved west 
while China received gold and other precious metals, ivory, and glass products. The 
route peaked during the first millennium, under the leadership of first the Roman and 
then Byzantine Empires, and the Tang dynasty (618–907) in China.
But the Crusades, as well as advances by the Mongols in Central Asia, dampened 
trade. By the sixteenth century, Asian commerce with Europe had largely shifted to mari-
time trade routes, which were cheaper and faster. Today, Central Asian countries are 
economically isolated, with intra-regional trade making up just 6.2% of all cross-border 
commerce. They are also heavily dependent on Russia, particularly remittances – which 
dropped 15% in 2014 due to Russia’s economic woes.
For the United States, the New Silk Road refers to a suite of joint investment projects 
and regional trade blocs that have the potential to bring economic growth and stability 
to Central Asia. Following the surge of thirty thousand additional troops into Afghani-
stan in 2009, which President Barack Obama’s administration had hoped would lay the 
groundwork for complete withdrawal a few years later, Washington began to lay out 
a strategy for supporting these initiatives through diplomatic means. These plans empha-
sized the need for Afghanistan to build an economy independent of foreign assistance. 
More than 1.6 billion consumers in India, Pakistan, and the rest of South Asia are in-
creasingly demanding energy supplies of the kind that Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, with 
their hydropower and natural gas reserves, are capable of providing.
The proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which 
could provide major economic dividends to Afghanistan, has been a focus of U.S. policy. 
Turkmenistan is home to the world’s second-largest deposit of natural gas, and the TAPI 
would allow it to diversify its exports away from China by delivering energy to India and 
Pakistan. But the $10 billion project has been repeatedly delayed by difficulties in securing 
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investors. Without the possibility of an equity stake, which Turkmenistan has refused to al-
low for foreign companies, major Western oil companies have so far balked at the project.
Chart 3. The Proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Pipeline
Source: The Energy Information Administration (EIA), Credits James Mc Bridge, Julia Ro, Council of For-
eign Relations, 2018.
In addition to the $1.7 billion that the United States has directed toward energy proj-
ects in Afghanistan since 2010, the State Department has spent over $2 billion to build 
some 1,800 miles of national roadways. That is a small fraction of the $62 billion the 
United States has spent on the Afghan security forces.
In 2011, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped create the 
Almaty Consensus, a Regional Cooperation Framework among Central Asian nations. 
Its projects include reducing trade barriers, developing export capacity, and supporting 
World Trade Organization (WTO) accession for Afghanistan.
These initiatives include the Cross-Border Transport Accord (CBTA) between Af-
ghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, the CASA-1000 electricity grid, which would 
allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to transmit hydropower electricity to consumers in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan, and the Transit-Trade Agreement to allow Afghanistan to export 
goods duty-free into Pakistan. The United States committed $15 million to the CASA-
1000 project, but its role – in contrast to China’s tens of billions of direct investments in 
Central Asia – is largely to facilitate these efforts diplomatically.
China has multiple reasons for pursuing the New Silk Road. Xi has promoted a vision 
of a more assertive China, while the ‘new normal’ of slowing growth puts pressure on the 
country’s leadership to open new markets for its consumer goods and excess industrial 
capacity (Besha, 2013). Promoting economic development in the troubled western prov-
ince of Xinjiang, where separatist violence has been on the upswing, is another major 
concern, as is securing long-term energy supplies.
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China’s strategy is conceived as a two-pronged effort. The first focuses on overland 
infrastructure development through Central Asia – the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ – while 
the second foresees the expansion of maritime shipping routes through the Indian Ocean 
and the Persian Gulf the ‘Maritime Silk Road.’
Chart 4. China’s Proposed New Silk Roads
Source: http://www.silkroutes.net/OBOR/9MapWallStreetJounal.jpg, June 9, 2018.
In 2013, Xi told an audience in Kazakhstan that he wants to create a vast network of 
railways, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings, both westward 
– through the mountainous former Soviet republics – and southward, toward Pakistan, 
India, and the rest of Southeast Asia. Such a network would also expand the international 
use of Chinese currency, the renminbi, in transactions throughout the region, while new 
infrastructure could “break the bottleneck in Asian connectivity,” according to Xi. The 
Asian Development Bank, highlighting the need for more such investments, estimates 
that the region faces a yearly infrastructure financing shortfall of nearly $800 billion.
Xi subsequently announced plans for the maritime silk road at the 2013 summit of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia. To accommodate 
expanding maritime trade traffic, China will invest in port development throughout the 
Indian Ocean, in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Pakistan.
In 2014, Xi concluded deals worth $30 billion with Kazakhstan, $15 billion with 
Uzbekistan, and $3 billion with Kyrgyzstan, in addition to spending $1.4 billion to help 
revamp the port of Colombo, in Sri Lanka. By November 2014, China had announced 
the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road Fund.
It must be emphasized that we have seen closer relations between India and the Unit-
ed States, finalizing a new Joint Strategic Vision of common cooperation. As the fifth-
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largest donor to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, India has played a leading role in support-
ing the U.S.-led efforts, spending more than $2 billion over the past decade.
Yet persistent territorial disputes have complicated deeper integration between India 
and its neighbors. Its borders with China have been unsettled since the two countries 
went to war over a disputed Himalayan border in 1962. India-Pakistan relations have 
been fraught since independence in 1947, and trade barriers persist between them, sow-
ing doubt over the ability of the two countries to undertake the kind of joint projects, like 
the TAPI pipeline, foreseen by the U.S. Silk Road strategy.
While China has expressed reservations over the deepening of India-U.S. relations, poli-
cymakers in New Delhi have long been unsettled by China’s embrace of Pakistan. In April 
2015, China’s Xi announced a massive $46 billion investment plan for Pakistani energy and 
transport infrastructure. This so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) aims to 
link Pakistan’s Indian Ocean port of Gwadar (now under Chinese management) to the west-
ern Chinese province of Xinjiang. Concern has also grown in India over Chinese investment 
in Sri Lanka, where China has expanded military as well as economic cooperation.
China’s ambitions have already run into local opposition. In Myanmar, popular pres-
sure stalled a planned $20 billion railway between the Myanmar city of Kyaukpyu and 
Kunming in China over anger that locals were not consulted on the project. Similarly, 
the newly elected government in Sri Lanka is subjecting the previous administration’s 
investment deals with China – which were shrouded in secrecy – to additional scrutiny.
For both the United States and China, Central Asian infrastructure projects face un-
forgiving terrain through steep mountain passes, as well as threats from armed militants. 
Separatist attacks in China’s Xinjiang and Pakistan’s Balochistan provinces as well as 
a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan are constant worries. Afghanistan in particular has 
now endured decades of civil strife and foreign intervention, and the country’s ability to 
Chart 5. Silk and spice trade routes
Source: http://www.silkroutes.net/OBOR/1MapUNESCO.jpg, June 9, 2018.
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shift from a war footing to embrace ambitious commercial projects will be central to the 
success or failure of the U.S. Silk Road strategy.
Finally, it remains to be seen how Russia’s ambitions in its own ‘near abroad’ in Central 
Asia will intersect with U.S. and Chinese efforts. With U.S.-Russia relations at their lowest 
point since the end of the Cold War, Russia has pursued its own regional integration efforts 
through the Eurasian Economic Union, which unites the economies of Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, and Armenia. China, too, is increasingly competing with Russia – displacing Rus-
sian investment and energy ties in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan – potentially 
ratcheting up tensions between Beijing and Moscow in the coming years (https://www.cfr.
org/backgrounder/building-new-silk-road, June 7, 2018; Pu, 2018).
2. The New Eurasia Land Bridge
This corridor, as proposed by China, will take the form of an international railway line 
from China’s Jiangsu province essentially in a horizontal line west to Rotterdam in Hol-
land. According to plans, it will be 11,800 km long and will serve over 30 countries. Along 
this corridor, China has already opened four freight train routes. These include a route from 
Chongqing to Duisburg (Germany), a direct route from Wuhan to Mēlník to Pardubice 
(Czech Republic), a route from Chengdu to Łódź (Poland) and one from Zhengzhou to 
Hamburg (Germany). In addition, along these routes China has issued the policy of ‘one 
declaration, one inspection, one cargo release’ to improve efficiency and ease. Further con-
struction projects of power transmission lines, highways and ports are progressing steadily 
(https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018; Pu, 2018).
Chart 6. The commercial weight of the New Silk Roads affected by the large regions in 2014
Source: http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/commodities-crash-boosts-chinas-new-silk-road/, June 9, 2018.
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Chart 7. The New Silk Road Commercial Corridors
Source: http://www.chinainvestmentresearch.org/press/massive-chinese-lending-directed-to-silk-road/, June 9, 
2018.
Chart 8. The most important stations of the new Silk Road
Source: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/07/interactive-map-follow-the-roads-railways-and-pipelines-on-
chinas-new-silk-road/, June 9, 2018.
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3. The China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor
This includes the three countries mentioned and is focused on two main routes; one 
being: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region-Hohnot-Mongolia-Russia and the other being: Dai-
lan-Shenyang Changchun-Harbin and Manzhouli to Russia’s city Chita. As regards the 
development of this corridor there were two major breakthroughs. First, in September 
2014, the three Heads of State of the countries in question met at the Shanghai Co-oper-
ation Organization (SCO) Dushanbe summit. Here they agreed on a tripartite coopera-
tion based on bilateral ties. In addition, they agreed to renovate Russia’s Eurasian Land 
Bridge and potentially develop Mongolia’s Steppe Road. The intention of their agree-
ment was to strengthen railway and highway connectivity, advance customs clearance, 
transport facilitation and promote cross-national cooperation. The second breakthrough 
was in July 2015 at a second summit held in Ufa in which the ‘mid-term road map for 
Development of trilateral Co-operation between China, Russia and Mongolia’ was for-
mally adopted. In June 2016, the three countries created a development plan to follow. 
Further agreements were signed in the Belt and Road initiative forum held in May 2017. 
In August 2016, a ceremonial delegation of trucks from the three countries was sent out 
to test the proposed corridor (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 
9, 2018; Pu, 2018).
4. China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor
This corridor is from Xinjiang to Alashankou to the railways of Central and West 
Asia to the Mediterranean Coast and finally the Arabian Peninsula. The corridor mainly 
covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan in Central Asia 
and Iran and Turkey in West Asia (although in total including 17 countries in West Asia). 
This corridor generally follows the path of the Ancient Silk Road. The most significant 
movement in developing this corridor was in June 2015 at the Third China-Central Asia 
Co-operation Forum held in Shandong. Here a joint declaration was signed by China and 
the five central Asian countries committing to “jointly building the Silk Road Economic 
Belt.” In 2016, the AIIB approved a loan of $27.5 million for the Dushanbe-Uzbekistan 
Border Road improvement project in Tajikistan. In 2017, the rehabilitation of the Nurek 
hydropower plant in Tajikistan was announced (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/ap-
proved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
5. China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC)
This route is from the Pearl River Delta and goes west along the Nanchong-Guang’an 
Expressway and Nanning-Guangzhou high-speed railway via Nanning and Pingxiang 
to Hanoi and Singapore. It links China with the Indochina Peninsula and goes through 
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar and Malaysia. As far as advances go, 
in December 2014 during the Fifth Leaders’ Meeting on Greater Mekong Subregion in 
Bangkok, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed ways to deepen ties with the five coun-
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tries in the Indochina Peninsula. Nine cross-border motorways in the area of the Greater 
Mekong Subregion are currently under construction. In the South, China has funded and 
built various roads in several regions of Indonesia. The Kunming-Singapore High-speed 
Rail network is a project designed to connect China to Indochina through three high-
speed railway routes; East (via Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Phnom Penh and Bangkok), Central 
(via Vientiane, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore) and West (via Mandalay, Yan-
gon and Bangkok). Most of this railway project within China is already complete and the 
railway is in operation in parts of Vietnam. Western segments are currently under con-
struction whilst Malaysia and Singapore are jointly upgrading sections from Thailand to 
Singapore (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
Within this corridor there are many plans for air route expansion and integration. 
ASEAN and China have already made a deal to allow Chinese airplanes to use ASEAN 
gateway city airports. This is in addition to the ASEAN ‘open skies policy,’ a policy 
which all ASEAN countries have ratified except for Indonesia, Laos and the Philippines 
who are still in the process of fully enacting it. Currently there are developments in the 
linking of Southeast Asian ports to major Chinese cities. The ASEAN region has a lot 
of potential for untapped coal, oil and gas which are likely to be utilized within the next 
ten years. China already has many projects in this area underway for example, in Laos, 
China’s Three Gorges Corporation has completed two hydropower projects. This cor-
ridor is made of ASEAN members most of whom already have a series of exceptionally 
well developed economic agreements, this will make trade easier. With the development 
of these countries there are many opportunities to develop the banking, finance and other 
professional services sector particularly since Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are revis-
ing regulations to encourage growth in this sector. Furthermore, regional institutions like 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are encouraging sustainable and efficient agricul-
ture within this region. However, China’s ties with Indochina are tense which may put 
a halt to the initiative in this corridor. For example, various CIPEC projects have been 
delayed due to disagreements over money (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/
index.htm, June 9, 2018).
6. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
This route is 3,000 km long and starts in Kashgar ending in Gwadar, connecting the 
Silk Road Economic Belt in the North and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in the 
South. In April 2015, both countries signed a joint declaration which stated that the two 
countries would be proactive in their joint projects that are designed to further connect 
the two countries. China has already invested $62 billion into the China-Pakistan eco-
nomic corridor. Along this corridor there is the plan to make Gwadar a special economic 
zone: a ‘new Dubai.’ The Gwadar port is central to the corridor with China investing 
£1.3 billion in order to develop it into a deep-sea port which will be managed by China 
under a 43-year lease granted to Chinese Overseas Ports (https://www.aiib.org/en/proj-
ects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
With the hopes to make Gwadar into a ‘new Dubai’ there are plans to turn it into an 
oil city with a petroleum refining zone as well as hubs for mining and minerals, agri-
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culture, food processing, technology and advanced manufacturing. There are also plans 
for a new Gwadar International Airport and Chinese investment in energy and water 
infrastructure. Furthermore, China is hoping to develop tertiary sectors and residential 
projects in Gwadar, e.g. in education, business services, retail and leisure. In addition, 
there are plans for a Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline and transport network. This will be a net-
work of railways, roads, telecommunications and energy supplies. The oil pipeline will 
cover 17% of China’s oil imports (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, 
June 9, 2018).
It will be financed by China and built by the Pakistani Frontier Works Organization, 
however, it will be technically difficult due to the mountainous terrain. Over half of 
the investments in this corridor will be focused on energy projects in order to combat 
Pakistan’s energy shortage. These projects are expected to double Pakistan’s electricity 
capacity. China has already invested a lot in coal-fired, nuclear and green energy. Cur-
rent developments include what is set to be the world’s largest solar plant in Bahawalpur, 
a hydropower plant in Karot, a wind power plant in Jhimpir, two nuclear power stations 
near Karachi and a major coal-fired power plant is being planned in Qasim which is 
aiming at providing around 20% of Pakistan’s energy shortfall (https://www.aiib.org/en/
projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
The Gwadar port will require technical and logistical investment, technical assistance 
in ports and petroleum refining zones as well as general shipping and maritime services. 
For the nuclear, solar and wind power plants there is a demand for companies special-
ized in design, construction and efficient maintenance. The Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline 
needs technical expertise to overcome the mountainous technical issue, However, there 
have been previous deals along this corridor that have fallen through due to issues of 
corruption and lack of transparency. Furthermore, there are issues between the Pakistani 
central government and local governments not cooperating as well as concerns over se-
curity across the country (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 
2018).
7. Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
This route includes the four countries mentioned with an emphasis on India. This 
corridor will cover 9% of the planet’s land mass and 440 million people. The main part 
of the corridor is a 2,800-km route running as follows; Kolkata-Dhaka-Mandalay-Kun-
ming. It will take the form of a series of railways, motorways, airways, waterways and 
telecom networks. In May 2013, China and India jointly proposed building this corridor 
together. In December 2013, the Working Group of the corridor met in Kunming. Here, 
official representatives of the four countries embarked on in-depth discussions. Follow-
ing this the countries signed meeting minutes agreeing to the Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar Economic Corridor Joint Study Programme establishing roots for coopera-
tion between the four countries, (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, 
June 9, 2018).
Bangladesh’s Vision 2021 proposed by the Bangladeshi government is focused on 
creating links with its neighbors as a main priority. In Bangladesh, the main areas of 
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investment will be energy, telecommunications and agriculture. Already, large trans-
port infrastructure projects are being carried out, such as Chinese companies build-
ing a £3.6 billion railway from Dhaka to Jessore. Energy infrastructure is also being 
developed. Bangladesh-China Power Company (Pvt.) Limited is focused on building 
a £1.3 billion coal-fired power plant in South Dhaka. Furthermore, the AIIB has ap-
proved a £133 million loan for Bangladesh to expand electricity into rural India. In 2015, 
China and India signed a £17.7 billion trade agreement which focused on renewable 
energy, steel, transport infrastructure and real estate sectors, e.g. the Chinese company 
Wanda Group is building an £8 billion industrial park in Haryana near Delhi (https://
www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
In Myanmar there is a large twin gas and oil pipeline project from the port of Kyauk-
pyu to Guanxi and Yunnan. The gas pipeline is already in use and the oil pipeline opened 
in April 2017. China is highly invested in Kyaukpyu and has developed the Kyaukpyu 
Special Economic Zone including a deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu, which is under devel-
opment led by Chinese CITI Group Corporation. China-led power and energy projects 
across Myanmar are already in action as is demonstrated by the £2.4 billion refinery in 
the South East which was granted approval in 2016.
There are environmental concerns and security issues in all countries within the cor-
ridor. In addition, it is the least developed corridor. That being said, there are long-term 
opportunities in shipping and maritime services as well as technical and logistical sup-
port (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
8. Opportunities the Belt and Road Initiative can offer foreign investors
By building greater connectivity and developing nations, once completed, the initia-
tive will make it easier for large multinationals and start-ups alike to reach new large 
consumer markets. It has been estimated that the growing middle class in Asia could 
number 4 billion by 2021 and, following on from this (according to HSBC), 66% of the 
world’s population could be living in Asia by 2030 (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/ap-
proved/index.htm, June 9, 2018). This will mean a continuously growing buyers’ market 
in Asia demanding luxury goods and services. It is worth noting that the initiative will 
reportedly be open to all nations and not limited by geography. Thus, the benefits of easy 
access to a growing market will be accessible to all investors regardless of their geo-
graphic background. Consequently, through the initiative this immense market will be 
accessible for all (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018; 
Pu, 2018).
The Belt and Road Initiative could be a good investment for private investors due to 
President Trump’s move to back out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The action 
means the Belt and Road Initiative is likely to gain more popularity and momentum as 
it is aimed at providing a vast network for international trade similar to the TPP. As the 
United States is starting to become more introverted, there is a gap being left on the 
world’s economic stage which will likely be filled by China. This view is supported by 
Louis Kuijs, head of Asia Economics at Oxford Economics in Hong Kong (https://www.
aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
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By investing in the initiative’s developing countries, investors are investing in creat-
ing more buying power and establishing efficient routes to fully utilize these new mar-
kets. The Chinese government is encouraging a mixture of foreign investment and do-
mestic investment in Belt and Road projects. Various banks and funds such as the New 
Development or ‘BRICS’ Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
are providing loans for such projects. In 2016, the AIIB committed $1.73 billion to nine 
development projects along the Belt and Road. According to the Articles of Agreement 
of the Bank, it will “provide or facilitate financing to any member, or any agency, instru-
mentality or political subdivision thereof, or any entity or enterprise operating in the ter-
ritory of a member, as well as to international or regional agencies or entities concerned 
with economic development of the Asia region” (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/ap-
proved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
The AIIB has three main requirements for financing projects: they have to be sus-
tainable in operation, environmentally friendly and widely accepted by public society. 
According to a China-Britain Business Council (CBBC) report, “immediate key sectors 
are infrastructure, maritime and logistics, banking and financial services, professional 
services and energy. Further opportunities also exist in the agriculture, fishing, food 
processing, light equipment manufacturing, education, tourism and consumer sectors” 
(https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018). Currently there 
are many large corporations who are in cooperation with Chinese banks and companies 
in countries along the Belt and Road, for example BP and CNPC who in 2015 saw the 
highest record of oil production in Iraq since 1990. Chinese enterprises such as Changan, 
China Mobile and BCEGI Construction and foreign-owned enterprises such as Pinsent 
Masons and NVC lighting are finding many opportunities for their service and expertise 
along the Belt and Road in aiding the development of the initiative (https://www.aiib.
org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018; Pu, 2018).
9. Key investment opportunities
9.1. Banking and financial services
Firstly, with the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there will be 
a large demand for expertise in complex financial tools. The participation of financial 
institutions in BRI will mean long-term access to capital and a more liquid and diverse 
market. Thus, companies investing in BRI will need both traditional services, e.g. loans 
and settlements, but also complex financial tools such as investment banking, third party 
agency facilities, risk control and financial management. Furthermore, BRI will push 
renminbi to expand thus creating the need for overseas financial centers. Environmen-
tal sustainability is very important for BRI and much of it needs to come from private 
investors. This creates opportunities for financial intermediaries to support financial in-
stitutions and governments in identifying, monitoring, supervising and evaluating green 
projects as information disclosure and risk control become more in demand (https://
www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
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Many banks such as the Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction Bank are 
issuing billions of dollars’ worth in BRI bonds. The bond market, e.g. Panda and Dim 
Sum Bonds, offers early access for foreign and private capital. Growth in BRI bond 
markets is likely to attract new bond issuers beyond Chinese banks thus creating greater 
opportunities for foreign enterprises. With the initiative, there is an increasing demand 
for commodities trading. This is evident by BOC launching offshore global commodity 
business centers in Singapore and providing £40 billion in financial services to support 
Chinese and Singaporean companies who want to invest in BRI (https://www.aiib.org/
en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
For other foreign investors, opportunities lie in providing input for the fostering of se-
cure, efficient and robust commodity trading and renminbi commodity financial innova-
tion. The immense size of BRI and the nature of there being significant risk in investing 
in the initiative means there are many opportunities in this field for risk management and 
insurers. Insurers can develop novel insurance products and services to aid companies 
investing in BRI. In addition, there are more opportunities for asset managers to act as 
collective financing mechanisms who can provide smaller or private investors access to 
large infrastructure projects. This is promising as much of the funding for the initiative is 
expected to be from private investors (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.
htm, June 9, 2018).
9.2. Legal services
BRI investments require legal advice and services due to the complexities that emerge 
with operating in many of the BRI countries. Many countries along the Belt and Road 
have different policies and practices and so need specialized help to find a common 
understanding and follow the legal requirements. For example, Clifford Chance advised 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank 
Corporation and Export-Import Bank of China on a £1.2 billion financing oil project 
in Jordan; and Linklaters advised China Development Bank Corporation on the largest 
Chinese-led power project in Indonesia. In addition, many BRI countries are developing 
and thus have basic tax, accounting and audit regimes (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/
approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
However, investors must have an understanding of the differences. This provides the 
opportunity for foreign enterprises to aid Chinese enterprises in understanding local regu-
lations and practices and assist them in following local tax and auditing laws. There are 
many opportunities for foreign enterprises in assessing investment environments and con-
ducting feasibility studies as BRI requires strategic advice and practical business solutions. 
Examples of foreign companies who provided advice to Chinese parties include JLT and 
PWC. China’s role in the shipping industry has grown and with it there are a multitude of 
legal requirements to be satisfied. A good opportunity for British investors lies in advising 
maritime services as English law is used in international maritime issues and processes. 
The size of this opportunity is immense given that China is currently producing 90% of the 
worlds standard dry cargo. BMT group and Pinsent Masons have already become involved 
in this prospect (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
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9.3. Infrastructure planning and development
Given the scale and nature of the initiative there are innumerable joint opportuni-
ties for international specialized companies and Chinese companies to build railways 
along the Belt and Road. Furthermore, there are numerous amounts of power generation 
and industrial development projects in BRI. Oil and gas pipelines as well as electricity 
transmission/distribution networks need to be sustainable and efficient and so need in-
ternational specialists to aid these projects (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/
index.htm, June 9, 2018).
In addition, water and waste management projects need specialists in city layouts, 
supporting regulatory frameworks, co-developing and operating the infrastructure (Do-
herty, Lu, 2013). More infrastructure projects along the Belt and Road means increased 
supply chain manufacturing facilities and research centers in third countries which pro-
vides many prospects for Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures. The development of the corridors 
increases the movement of goods, commodities and people thus requiring efficient lo-
gistics centers to cope with these ‘macro-flows.’ DP World is an example of a company 
already invested in this project. In all the vast urbanization projects across the Belt and 
Road there will emerge many opportunities such as investing in education within these 
new cities (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
9.4. Energy
Over half of the infrastructure funds along the Belt and Road will go towards elec-
tricity supply thus meaning there are many opportunities in this sector (Downs, 2008). 
Areas in the ASEAN region have a lot of gas and oil. Therefore, there is a demand for 
international expertise on marine environments, resource exploration, developments and 
optimal exploitation. The Keller Group is already involved in this opportunity. Simi-
larly, coal/nuclear power generation requires legal, technical and operational/manage-
ment support (Downs, 2008). Renewable energy projects are becoming more price 
competitive thus creating opportunities for smaller solar and wind power plants (Hou, 
Zhang, 2012). In 2017, China announced a nationwide carbon trading market, however, 
they need expertise on trading markets, carbon credit obligations schemes, regulatory 
frameworks and professional services that support planning and development. KPMG 
has already aided China in this area (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.
htm, June 9, 2018).
10. How the Belt and Road Initiative will impact China’s economy
There have been many queries over how the Belt and Road initiative will actually 
be implemented due to its immense cost requirement and subsequent infrastructure fi-
nancing gap (Doherty, Lu, 2013). The issue is a result of China providing the majority 
of the funds. This is demonstrated by a 2015 case study where Beijing’s Import and 
Export Bank of China lent $80 billion to the initiative, compared to the Asian Develop-
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ment Bank which lent $27 billion. Given that the Asian Development Bank estimates 
the initiative will cost over $22.6 trillion by 2030, it brings into question how China 
will be able to continue burdening this weight of carrying the initiative. The answer 
lies in China’s financing resources such as the Silk Road Fund, the ten major coopera-
tion projects announced at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the AIIB, the New 
Development Bank and loans from Chinese policy banks. In addition, the Belt and Road 
Initiative will eventually start paying for itself or at least providing significant returns. As 
of March 2017, Chinese companies have made over $50 billion from investments related 
to the initiative and many projects have already been launched in countries connected 
through the initiative (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 
2018; Pu, 2018).
Within the first eight months of 2016, China’s trade with BRI countries exceeded 
$600 billion. Estimates suggest that the initiative will make China’s annual trade along 
the Belt and Road over $2.5 trillion. Aside from monetary returns, the initiative provides 
an outlet for China’s immense industrial capacity. It creates and protects jobs in the 
industrial field as well as helps to maintain economic growth. Furthermore, the con-
nections to Russian and Iranian oil and gas will protect China’s energy needs whilst 
pipelines on the coast of countries such as Myanmar and Pakistan enable more diverse 
maritime routes and thus a greater outlet for Chinese goods. Exports to BRI countries 
have grown faster than total exports since 2013 demonstrating the potential of the Belt 
and Road initiative for China’s growing economy (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/ap-
proved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
11. Potential expansion of renminbi
Firstly, it is worth noting that at this current moment the U.S. dollar is still the most 
popular choice of currency for settlements along the Belt and Road. Whilst it is not 
a specific aim of the Belt and Road Initiative, the initiative provides three possible routes 
through which renminbi (RMB) could be internationalized. BRI could promote RMB 
settlement through the current account (Doherty, Lu, 2013). Currently China is aiming 
for their trade with BRI countries to reach around $2.5 trillion per year within the next 
ten years. Given that China is promoting the use of RMB on the Belt and Road this 
would mean an immense amount of RMB exchanging hands internationally. In addition, 
greater export of goods and services along the Belt and Road will mean an increased 
demand for RMB trade settlement and currency mobility. For example, in 2015, Chi-
nese companies signed 3,987 construction contracts in BRI countries, this is 44.1% of 
the value of Chinese overseas construction projects (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/
approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
The Initiative could improve RMB outflows through the capital account. Between 
January 2012 and September 2015, the number of China’s Outward Direct Investments 
(ODI) settled in RMB increased from ¥0.2 billion to ¥20.8 billion. The Belt and Road 
Initiative means more markets. For example, in 2015, China’s ODIs involved 49 BRI 
countries with investments connected to BRI reaching $14.8 billion (18.2% higher than 
2014). ODIs in BRI countries will increase with its development and thus RMB outflow 
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will rise 18% through the capital account, also RMB trade settlements for BRI countries 
are more likely to utilize RMB to avoid transaction fees and exchange rate issues (https://
www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
BRI could promote the international spread of RMB as a store of value. Already 
the demand for RMB in BRI countries is increasing and countries along the Belt and 
Road are becoming more open to using RMB as a reserve asset. The initiative will also 
encourage countries to use RMB in their foreign exchange reserves. South Korea, Ma-
laysia and Cambodia have already made RMB one of their reserve currencies, a trend 
expected to be followed with the growth of the initiative. Another contributing factor to 
the spread of RMB, which will only be enhanced by BRI is the inclusion of RMB by the 
IMF in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) Basket on October 1, 2016. Other currencies 
in the basket are USD, GBP, EUR and JPY. China is the first emerging economy to be 
included. Being in the SDR Basket massively boosts RMB credibility with international 
investors; the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) predicts that following this move RMB 
in foreign central banks’ official reserves could exceed 4% soon. Furthermore, Standard 
Chartered Bank predicts that the total net purchases of China’s bonds and stocks could 
reach ¥5.5 trillion ($791 billion) and ¥6.2 trillion respectively by 2020 (https://www.aiib.
org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018; Pu, 2018).
The inclusion of RMB encourages the Chinese government to continue banking and 
financial sector reforms as well as capital-account liberalization (Doherty, Lu, 2013). 
If this reform and economic growth continues then RMB denominated assets will be-
come increasingly regarded as ‘safe assets’ by global investors and sovereigns. Since 
Eurozone bonds are not viewed as being as safe as they were pre-2008, downgrades 
have been issued to many European countries including Austria, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and France, resulting in the decline of their supply of global ‘safe 
assets.’ Banks need more low-risk assets to meet regulatory requirements. Since the 
debt issues of developed countries cannot easily be solved there is the prospect of 
emerging economies such as China to develop opportunities for banks that satisfy the 
need for risk-free or low-risk assets (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.
htm, June 9, 2018).
If RMB becomes seen as a safe and liquid asset the demand for RMB will increase. 
Standard Chartered Bank predicts that the proportion of RMB assets in global foreign 
exchange reserves will increase from 1% to 5% within five years. In addition, RMB is 
affected by the growth and international respect of the Chinese bank AIIB. Through 
the increased credibility and use of RMB BRI countries will be even more inclined to 
utilize RMB in trade. Estimates from the Chinese Government suggest that by 2020 
half of China’s foreign trade will be settled in RMB. Peter Wong, Deputy Chairman 
and Chief Executive, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, says: 
“As the commercial activities between China and countries along the BRI become more 
frequent, RMB will gain wider acceptance” (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/
index.htm, June 9, 2018]). Consequently, HSBC recommended that “companies who 
haven’t already adopted RMB should consider doing so now if they plan on participating 
in BRI growth and expansion.” BRI growth has many advantages for foreign investors 
as laid out previously in How the Belt and Road Initiative can affect Foreign Investors 
(https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 2018).
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12. The Belt and Road Initiative now and in the future
In June 2017, it was announced that the China Railway Group Ltd will build a high-
speed railway in Russia connecting Yekaterinburg to Chelyabinsk as a further effort to 
develop and connect as many areas on the Belt and Road as possible. This will be a part of 
high-speed corridor that goes through Berlin, Moscow, Astana and Beijing. On June 23, 
2017, it was announced that the World Bank and AIIB were jointly lending $380 million 
to Andhra Pradesh (a southern state in India), to be used for a power project that aims to 
provide power for the whole population. The loan will take the ratio 60:40 World Bank, 
AIIB respectively. China also recently invested $3.6 billion in the Nairobi Mombasa 
railway which was opened on May 31, 2017 (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/
index.htm, June 9, 2018).
Furthermore, in 2017, India and Japan presented plans to establish the Asia-Africa 
Growth Corridor (AAGC) which will focus on transport development, health care, cri-
sis management and agriculture. As a result of the May 2017 Belt and Road Initiative 
Forum, over 130 bilateral and regional agreements with countries along the Belt and 
Road have been signed by China (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.
htm, June 9, 2018). In a drive to improve rail infrastructure, economic development 
and trade cooperation, the railway authorities of China, Belarus, Germany, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, Poland and Russia have jointly signed an agreement to improve cooperation 
on China-Europe freight rail services (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.
htm, June 9, 2018).
Furthermore, the forum saw more developments in the initiative through agree-
ments such as the Intergovernmental Agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
with Thailand as well as the Chinese government’s signing of an MOU on Coopera-
tion (2017–2020) with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization. In March 2017, in support of BRI, the Hong Kong Government released 
a bill detailing plans to offer tax concessions in order to encourage aircraft leasing 
companies to develop branches in Hong Kong. This is in addition to the recent growth 
of Chinese parties controlling aviation companies. For example, the HNA group re-
cently acquired Irish and U.S. aircraft leasing companies Avalon and CIT (respective-
ly). Furthermore, Chinese airlines have been increasing their international air routes 
as is demonstrated by the China-Australia agreement which allows both countries’ 
airlines to have unrestricted international access into each other’s markets under an 
open aviation market (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.htm, June 9, 
2018; Kuijs, 2009).
It must be emphasized that China’s foreign policy apparatus (Heilmann and 
Schmidt, 2014) should pursue various reforms to strengthen its coordination of do-
mestic and foreign policies (Doherty, Lu, 2013). As China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (Jones, 2015) served as an outside incentive for domestic reform 
(Bagwell, Staiger, 1999; Barreau, 1990) the Chinese leaders could use OBOR as an in-
ternational incentive to fundamentally reform China’s foreign policy apparatus (Bathelt, 
2003; Heilmann, Schmidt, 2014). For instance, China could balance the internal and 
external functions of the National Security Commission and strengthen its control over 
foreign affairs (Bathelt, 2003; Heilmann, Schmidt, 2014; https://www.researchgate.
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net/publication/312533416_One_Belt_One_Road_Visions_and_Challenges_of_Chi-
na’s_Geoeconomic_Strategy, June 09, 2018; Pu, 2018).
Conclusion
Once a major engine of global economic growth, the Chinese economy faces increas-
ing challenges. With a slowing economy and a falling foreign exchange reserve, China 
will find it increasingly challenging to fund all the ambitious OBOR projects. Recent 
market fluctuations and the economic slowdown in China may also undermine support 
for such grand international projects. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to assume that BRI 
could solve all of China’s economic problems. As discussed before, BRI could potential-
ly worsen the policy atmosphere of China’s market-driven reform, as many government 
agencies and SOEs implement ambitious projects in a hasty manner. Ultimately, China 
must deepen its domestic reform to deal with its long-term economic challenges.
BRI is typically viewed as an economic development strategy for China. It could in-
stead be viewed as China’s new geoeconomic strategy, given that the economic and po-
litical calculations are not separable. If implemented successfully, BRI would potentially 
create a new, China-led international economic, diplomatic, and even security system. 
BRI has great potential to transform China’s domestic and foreign policy, but it faces 
many challenges. While some argue that the implementation of BRI indicates the ending 
of low-profiled approach, there is still enormous continuity in China’s diplomacy. China 
continues emphasizing its developing country status as well as its peaceful development 
strategy.
China’s strategists and scholars are actively debating China’s visions of the interna-
tional order in a new era. Should China support the existing order that has benefited its 
rise but might also constrain its potential? Or should China try to create an entirely new 
order, which might bring higher benefit with higher risk? China has different choices 
over the roles it could play. China could play the role of a spoiler, delegitimizing the 
existing America-led order and replacing it with something entirely new. It could also 
continue its integration into the existing order and play the role of a supporter. Finally, 
China could also act as a shirker, attaining the privileges of power but failing to pay for 
them by contributing to global governance. The uncertainties of BRI are driven by the 
competing roles China might want to play on the world stage.
China has to manage its seemingly conflicted roles and interests, which are those of 
both a developing country and a developed one, and a weak country and a strong one. 
With multiple identities, China finds it increasingly difficult to define its interests in 
a coherent way. Officials and scholars in China’s foreign policy circle actively debate 
the opportunities and responsibilities of being a great power. While BRI is an ambitious 
plan, it faces many challenges. China must deal with huge security risks in many regions 
in which it is pursuing BRI projects. BRI also faces challenges in diplomacy and geo-
politics. The United States is increasingly suspicious of China’s long-term intentions. 
While the United States wants China to play a larger role as a ‘responsible stakeholder,’ 
China appears to have become not only a more influential stakeholder but also a potential 
‘rule-maker.’ While many neighboring countries welcome China’s economic opportuni-
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ties, they also increasingly worry about the strategic implications of China’s economic 
power. To implement BRI successfully, China must demonstrate self-restraint, reassur-
ing its neighbors that it will continue pursuing a peaceful rise strategy. China also faces 
domestic and institutional challenges in the implementation of BRI.
The future of China’s economy will shape the trajectory of BRI. It must be empha-
sized that in China’s case national power depends above all on the performance of the 
domestic economy and the ability to mobilize and allocate its resources. As China’s 
geoeconomic strategy, BRI will largely depend on the resilience and strength of China’s 
economic power. The Chinese economy faces increasing challenges, and BRI cannot 
solve all of China’s economic problems. Ultimately, China’s domestic reforms will de-
termine whether its economy will be transformed into a more sustainable model. In this 
sense, Chinese foreign policies are an extension of China’s domestic politics.
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Kierunki rozwoju nowej chińskiej inicjatywy Pasa i Drogi 
 
Streszczenie
Szlak jedwabny od czasów starożytnych do wczesnego średniowiecza był głównym szlakiem han-
dlowym łączącym Chiny z Europą i Bliskim Wschodem. Chiny zapowiedziały w roku 2013 rewitaliza-
cję tego szlaku dla intensywnego wsparcia swojej gospodarki. Zamierzają one przeznaczyć ok. 113 mi-
liardów euro na infrastrukturę nowych tras handlowych do Europy, Azji i Afryki. Pojawiają się jednak 
obawy, że Chiny będą chciały w ten sposób rozszerzyć przede wszystkim swój wpływ na gospodarkę 
światową. Podkreśla się, że nikt nie chce Chinom zabronić budowy infrastruktury, lecz chodzi raczej 
o współpracę, która byłaby ekonomicznym sukcesem dla wszystkich stron. Z tego względu plany Au-
stralii, Stanów Zjednoczonych, Indii i Japonii w kierunku zachowania określonej równowagi, należy 
postrzegać raczej jako alternatywę niż jako konkurencję do nowego jedwabnego szlaku.
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